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COMMENT
REGULATION OF SECURITY ISSUES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES BY
TEE NEW YORK PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION - 1929-1949
LAWRENCE L. GRAYt
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-four years ago, two young lawyers who were embarking upon nota-
ble careers in the field of public utility regulation were among the first to
recognize the great importance of the power to regulate the issuance of public
utility securities. For David E. Lilienthal and Irwin S. Rosenbaum in their
study' of the work of the New York Public Service Commission before 1929
in regulating security issues of utility companies emphasized the potential
effectiveness of this method of control available to regulatory commissions.
Since 1928, however, text writers and commentators have given little attention
to this important means of regulating public utilities. There was a considera-
ble amount of work published on this subject in the late 1920's and early
1930'sI'- when state legislatures began to perceive the need for regulatory
action2 to cope with the abuses brought about by the wild financing and pyra-
miding of holding companies in the 1920's which culminated in the painful
and often disastrous collapses of the depression era of the 1930's. The passage
of the Securities Act of 1933,3 the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935,I and the Federal Power Act of 19355 showed the concern of Congress
over the abuses of interstate holding and operating utility companies in the
issuance of securities, and by these statutes Congress now reaches utilities
beyond the control of the regulatory power of the states.
Through its control over the issuance of securities, the New York Public
Service Commission illustrates how the interests of the public, of consumers,
and of investors can be safeguarded. By requiring that securities proposed to
be issued be backed by properties exceeding in value the amount of those
securities and capable of earning substantially more than the interest and
dividend charges thereon, the New York Commission has done much to insure
adequate and dependable service by the utilities. At the same time such a
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Issuance of Securities by Public Service Corporations, 37
YALE L. J. 716, 908 (1928).
la. See, e.g., Banrs, PUrac UTILTY CONTMROL n; MLASSACHUSETTS (1930); Rosenbaum,
Regulation of Security Issues by the Ohio Public Utilities Commission, 4 U. oF Cur. L.
REv. 321 (1930); Rosenbaum & Lilienthal, supra note 1; Waltersdorf, State Control of
Utility Capitalization, 37 YALE L. J. 337 (1928).
2. Waltersdorf, supra note la, at 342.
3. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77a (1946).
4. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (1946). See 79 Coo. Rac. 8383 (1935), for a
discussion of the findings of the Federal Trade Commission on the abuses of utility financ-
ing prompting corrective legislation by Congress.
5. 49 STAT. 838, as amended, 49 STAT. 863 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 791a (1946).
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policy, carried out by means of effective investigative powers to ascertain
the state of the utilities' properties and their earning power, protects the in-
vestors and owners against the evils of overcapitalization with its dangerous
tendency towards reorganization, bankruptcy or foreclosure.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the work of the New York
Public Service Commission between 1929 and 19490 in the regulation of
securities issued by New York public utilities. Emphasis will be placed on the
electric and gas companies, but some attention will also be given to other utili-
ties. The problems met by the Commission in determining what are security
issues requiring the consent of the Commission under the statute, in handling
petitions for the issuance of securities for the various purposes specified in
the statute, in attempting to persuade the companies to provide for adequate
depreciation of plant and equipment and for adjustment of inflated plant
accounts by imposing conditions on the issuance of securities, are the chief
topics considered by this paper. It is hoped that an examination of what the
New York Public Service Commission has done in the regulation of security
issues of public utilities since 1928 will provide some insight into the larger
problem of utility regulation in general.
II. STATUTORY BASIS OF THE COMISSION'S POWER TO REGULATE
SECURITY ISSUES
The New York Public Service Commission was created in 1907 by statute
7
when the New York Legislature abolished the Board of Railroad Commis-
sioners, which had prior to that time regulated public utilities, and replaced
the Board with the Public Service Commission. Before 1907 security issues
were not effectively regulated.8 More extensive powers to regulate the issu-
ance of utility securities were conferred on the Public Service Commission by
the 1907 statute in substantially the same form as embodied in the present
Public Service Law.9 The latter statute provides, in almost identically worded
sections, for the regulation of security issues of common carriers, railroads,
and street railways,' of omnibus corporations, 1 of electric and gas corpora-
tions,' 2 of steam corporations,' 3 of water corporations,' 4 and of telegraph and
6. For a discussion of the regulation of security issues by the New York Commission
up to 1928, see Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, supra note 1.
7. N. Y. Laws 1907, c. 429.
8. See Rosenbaum and Lflienthal, supra note 1, at 717.
9. Jurisdiction of the Commission over telegraph and telephone corporations was con-
ferred by N. Y. Laws 1910, c. 673; over steam corporations by N. Y. Laws 1913, c. 505;
over omnibus corporations by N. Y. Laws 1931, c. 531; and over water corporations by
N. Y. Laws 1931, c. 715. The 1907 statute (N. Y. Laws 1907, c. 429) had conferred Juris-
diction over common carriers and over electric and gas corporations.
10. N. Y. PUB. SERv. LAW § 55.
11. Id. § 62.
12. Id. § 69.
13. Id. § 82.
14. Id. § 89f.
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telephone corporations.' 5 The Commission has asserted jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation operating a gas plant in New York, and this has been
upheld.1 ' Similarly, the Commission has assumed jurisdiction over non-New
York telegraph and telephone corporations where the proceeds of security
issues are used in New York.' 0
Since the provisions of the various sections of the Public Service Law as
to security issues are substantially the same, a brief summary of and quotations
from Section 69 of the statute pertaining to electric and gas utility companies,
will furnish a basis for the examination of the Commission's work that is to
follow. Section 69 provides that an electric or gas corporation-
"... may issue stocks, bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness, payable
.. more than twelve months after the date thereof ... for the acquisition of prop-
erty, the construction, completion, extension or improvement of its plant or dis-
tributing system, or for the improvement or maintenance of its service or the dis-
charge or lawful refunding of its obligations or for the reimbursement of moneys
actually expended from income or from any other moneys in the treasury . . . not
... obtained from the issue of stocks, bonds, notes or other evidences of indebted-
ness... ; provided... there shall have been secured from the commission an order
authorizing such issue . . . and that in the opinion of the commission the money,
property or labor to be procured or paid for by the issue of such stock, bonds, notes
or other evidences of indebtedness is or has been reasonably required for the purposes
specified in the order and that except as otherwise permitted in the order in the
case of bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness, such purposes are not in
whole or in part reasonably chargeable to operating expenses or to income. ... "
Section 69 of the Public Service Law goes on to include the sale of re-
acquired securities previously issued in compliance with Section 69 as a security
issue requiring commission authorization. Stock dividends cannot be authorized
by the Commission, and notes payable within twelve months may be issued
without the Commission's consent, but they may not be refunded by securi-
ties payable more than twelve months after date of issue unless authorization
for the refunding securities is first obtained from the Commission. Within ten
days after the issuance of all notes, bonds, stocks, and other evidences of
indebtedness, whether maturing more or less than twelve months after issue,
the corporation issuing securities must file with the Commission a notice of
such transaction.
These are the most significant provisions of Section 69 of the Public
Service Law. Before taking up the problems arising therefrom that have
15. Id. § 101.
15a. Matter of Penn-York Natural Gas Corp. v. Malthie et al., 164 Misc. 569, 299
N. Y. Supp. 1004 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
16. N. Y. PuB. SERv. LAW § 101; Re Western Union Telegraph Co., 60 P.U.R. (n;.s.)
57 (1945) (Commission took jurisdiction where foreign corporation failed to show the
proceeds of securities issued were used wholly outside New York). Cf. Re Western Union
Telegraph Co., 51 P.U.R. (x.s.) 404 (1943) where the N. Y. Commisson refused to
pass on the issuance of securities in the merger of two domestic telegraph corporations
previously approved by the Federal Communications Commission.
19531
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faced the New York Public Service Commission in the past two decades, brief
mention should be made of the so-called Knight Commission which investi-
gated the work of the Public Service Commission in 1930 and whose report"
recommended revisions in the Public Service Law. Most of the recommenda-
tions as to regulation of security issues were enacted into the present Public
Service Law. However, the recommendation that Section 10118 be amended
so as to be uniform with the other sections as to the Public Service Com-
mission's lack of jurisdiction over foreign utility companies has not yet been
enacted into the statute. Nor has the Knight Commission's recommenda-
tion that the amount of notes maturing within twelve months be limited
to five per cent of the stated value of securities outstanding been carried
out by the New York Legislature.
Another gap formerly existing in the Public Service Commission's regu-
latory authority over security issues that was recommended for revision by
the Knight Commission was closed up by the enactment in 193510 of an
amendment to Section 38 of the Stock Corporation Law. By that amendment
a utility corporation under the Public Service Commission's jurisdiction must
obtain the latter's consent to a change in the corporation's capital stock under
Section 36 of the Stock Corporation Law brought about by a reduction or in-
crease in the number of shares or of their par value, or by a reduction of
capital, or by the classification or reclassification of shares, before filing such
change in the certificate of incorporation with the Secretary of State.
The foregoing are the most important provisions of the Public Service
Law relating to the issuance of securities by utilities subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the New York Public Service Commission. We shall now consider
the more perplexing problems involved in the Commission's determinations
as to what kinds of transactions constitute security issues within the mean-
ing of the statute.
III. WHAT Is A SECURITY ISSUE REQUIRING COMMISSION CONSENT?
A. Short tern Notes
Since Section 69 of the Public Service Law requires Commission consent
only where the stocks, bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness are
payable more than one year after issue, the utility companies may obtain
short-term loans for one year periods or less without having to secure
authorization therefor from the Commission. The possibilities of abuse of such
a privilege were recognized by the Commission in Patchogue Electric Light
Co. case in 1948.20 There the Commission required as a condition to the
authorization of a bond issue that the company submit a plan to retire
17. 1 REPORT OF Com-ArssioN ON RsvisIoN OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE CommissioN LAw
(1930). See 40 YALE L. J. 17 (1931), for a contemporary analysis of the Knight Com-
mission report.
18. N. Y. PUB. SERV. LAv § 101.
19. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 760, now incorporated in N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 38.
20. Re Patchogue Electric Light Co., 73 P.U.R. (N.s.) 129 (1948).
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promptly $225,000 in notes maturing in one year or less. These notes had
been renewed year after year for at least six years. The Commission declared
that "the continuation of this form of indebtedness beyond the period of one
year allowed by the statute merely by the substitution of one note for
another is dearly a violation of the intent of the statute." 2'
The above noted case seems to be in accord with the general purpose of
the Public Service Law. The total amount of the Patchogue Company's
capital (including the notes in question) was only $725,000, and such an
abuse of the short-term note exemption under Section 69 of the Public Ser-
vice Law would seem to be within the Commission's power to strike dovM.
However, whether the New York courts would sustain the imposition of such
a condition as was required in the Patchogue case is not at all certain. The
New York Legislature has not enacted into law the recommendation of the
Knight Commission22 that short-term indebtedness be limited to five per cent
of the stated value of total securities outstanding. The exemption from the
Commission's jurisdiction of notes payable within one year is unambiguous;
attempts by the Commission to by-pass the statute by using the effective
weapon of withholding prompt consent to security issues unless the com-
panies seeking authorization comply with conditions like those in the
Patchogue case may not stand up on appeal to the courts. Legislative action
is needed. Unless a check is imposed on unwise short-term loans, the Com-
mission could be faced by a petition for a security issue to finance plant
construction completed and paid for with short-term credit; in such a situa-
tion, the Commission might be forced to authorize security issues which it
might have reasonably refused if requested for proposed construction.
B. Reclassification of Stock
A problem that confronts the Commission frequently is that of reclassifica-
tion of common and preferred stock. Even before the 1935 amendment to
the Stock Corporation Law mentioned previously,23 which empowered the
Commission to give or deny consent to reclassifications of stock, the Appel-
late Division had held that the Commission had authority to deny or grant
consent, under Section 69 of the Public Service Law, to a reclassification
of voting common stock. In Public Setvice Comnmission v. N. Y. and Rich-
mond Gas Co. 24 the court held that a reclassification of 150,000 shares of
voting common stock into 142,500 shares of non-voting preferred and 7,500
21. Id. at 133. Cf. Everett v. Phillips et al., 288 N. Y. 227, 43 N. E. 2d IS (1942),
where a minority shareholder sued to compel the directors of an electric utility to demand
payment of loans made to another electric utility payable within one year, and renewed
annually for several years. The court held that Section 69 of the Public Service Law
did not make such repeated renewals illegal so as to require the directors to call in the
loans.
22. 1 REPORT OF ComimsioN ON REvIsIoN or TnE PuBLic SERavcE Coans uszs LAw
38 (1930).
23. See note 19 supra.
24. 244 App. Div. 398, 279 N. Y. Supp. 824 (3d Dep't 193S).
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shares of voting common stock, was an issue of securities within the mean-
ing of Section 69 of the Public Service Law. The case is of more than academic
interest despite the amendment to Section 38 of the Stock Corporation Law in
1935 following the decision for the court construed Section 69 of the Public Ser-
vice Law broadly so as to carry out the Legislature's purpose to give the Com-
mission "extensive powers of regulation and supervision to protect not only
utility corporations and their stockholders but primarily the investing pub-
liC." 25 The court interpreted Section 69 to mean that "no gas or electric
corporation may issue stock for any purpose without the consent of the
Commission."26  Thus the 6ourt refuted the company's contention that
Section 69 conferred jurisdiction on the Commission only as to securities
issued for purposes specified in the statute. The court cited a Court of
Appeals case27 of the previous year to the effect that Section 69 should be
liberally construed to empower the Commission to look into the purpose
to which the proceeds of notes payable within one year were put where the
company sought to refund the notes by issuing long-term bonds.
In 1940 the Court of Appeals affirmed an Appellate Division opinion up-
holding the power of the Commission under Section 38 of the Stock Corpora-
tion Law to withhold consent to a proposed reclassification by a gas and
electric utility of $3,000,000 of stated capital into a "Contingency Reserve."- 8
The Appellate Division said that the power conferred on the Commission by
Section 38 of the Stock Corporation Law to give "consent and approval" to
a reclassification of capital did not mean that giving such consent was merely
a formal matter. Rather, the Commission has power to consider the inter-
ests of the bondholders and preferred shareholders who would suffer from
an impairment of assets caused by the payment of dividends charged to the
Contingency Reserve created by the transfer from the common stock capital
account. The Commission was upheld in this case notwithstanding the fact
that the amount sought to be transferred from capital to the reserve account
had been itself transferred from surplus to capital by a resolution of the
board of directors in 1930.
The Commission has, however, in a 1945 case involving the Staten Island
Edison Corporation,29 declined to assert its power to deny authorization of a
reclassification of common stock where the stock had originally been re-
classified without the consent of the Commission and, therefore, in violation
of the statute. The stock had passed through at least nine different owners
since 1930, the year of the unauthorized reclassification. The Commission
25. Id. at 401, 279 N. Y. Supp. at 827.
26. Ibid.
27. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm. et al., 263 N. Y. 209, 188 N. E.
713 (1934).
28. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Maltbie et a!., 258 App. Div. 682, 18 N. Y. S. 2d
630 (3d Dep't), arff'd without opinion, 284 N. Y. 626, 29 N. E. 2d 936 (1940).
29. Staten Island Edison Corp., I ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PuBLIC SERvxcE CoMMIssb N
63 (1945).
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stated that it would not be feasible to declare the original reclassification
void and restore the status prior to 1930. The Commission accordingly ap-
proved the company's plan to decrease the number of shares outstanding and
reduce the stated value of the stock from $14,600,000 to 7,400,000! °
Through its power to regulate the alteration of stockholders' rights by
reclassification of capital stock of utilities, the Public Service Commission
has been able to more closely integrate its regulatory authority. By means
of this power the Commission can prevent unwise attempts to alter the rights
of shareholders and thereby help to bring about confidence in the securi-
ties of public utilities by strengthening the financial position of the com-
panies and increasing their ability to provide service to the public.
C. Other Types of Security Issues
The Commission has also asserted its power to authorize security issues
in another situation not specifically covered by the statute. In a 1938 case'
the Commission made a determination that notes or agreements payable more
than one year after date of issue and intended to be delivered to customers by
an electric and gas corporation for contributions made by the customers
to line extensions had to be authorized by the Commission. The company
was told that it must apply to the Commission for authority to issue these
notes (which were to be paid within ten years out of revenues earned by
the line extensions) in accordance with Section 69 of the Public Service Law.
A case arose in 193732 involving an electric and gas corporation where the
Commission, after an investigation of the practices of the company, declared
illegal the dealing in its own securities through a subsidiary company. Chair-
man Maltbie, declared for the Commission, that the utility company had
violated Section 69 of the Public Service Law by selling its own securities
without the consent of the Commission after reacquiring such securities.
IV. PuRPosEs FOR WHiCH SEcuRITEs MAY BE ISSUED
A. Refunding
1. General
One of the purposes for which a utility company may issue securities is
the "discharge or lawful refunding of its obligations. ' 'ss Because of the
huge amount of refunding that has occurred in the past two decades to
30. In re New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 19 P.U.R. (,ms.) 122 (1937), the
Commission declared null and void the attempted reclassification of common stock into
two classes of common and preferred, and an attempted redemption of the preferred
thereby created was declared void. Cf. Re New York Power & Light Corp, 63 P.U.R.
(x.s.) 318 (1946) where the company was allowed to change preferred stock to common
so as to avoid payment of a substantial tax levied on the issuance of new common shares.
31. Re New York State Electric and Gas Corp., 23 P.U. R. (ms.) 286 (1938).
32. Orange & Rocldand Electric Co., 1 AiuAL REPORT oF Tr- Pu r c SzznxcE Com-
mnssiox 883 (1937).
33. N. Y. PuB. Simv. LAW §§ 55, 62, 69, 82, 89f, 101.
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take advantage of lower interest and dividend rates,8 4 the Public Service
Commission has encountered many problems in handling petitions seeking
authorization for refunding outstanding securities. The Commission en-
courages such financing3 5 and requires that all bonds issued be callable.3 0
In fact the Commission has gone so far as to warn the utility companies that
it will, in rate cases, consider the fact that refunding at lower interest or
dividend rates has not been availed of when proceedings to determine the
proper rate of return are in process.
3 7
2. Use To Which Proceeds of Refunded Obligations Were Put
It is the policy of the Commission to make a careful investigation of the
use to which the proceeds of the obligations to be refunded were put before
authorizing the refunding securities.38 The Commission has refused to
authorize the issuance of securities where the refunded obligation was in-
curred and the proceeds applied to purposes not authorized by the statute.
Thus, an electric utility has been denied permission to refund bank loans
with bonds where the proceeds of the bank loans had been used to buy
stock of a subsidiary company.39 In 1934 the Court of Appeals had previously
upheld the power of the Commission to look into the purposes to which the
proceeds of open account indebtedness and notes payable within one year
were put where the utility sought to refund such obligations.40 In that
case the company had not adduced satisfactory evidence as to the use to
which the proceeds of the loans had been put, and the Commission denied
permission to issue refunding bonds. It appeared that the Staten Island
Edison Corporation had purchased bonds of an affiliate with the proceeds
of the 364-day notes sought to be refunded. The court construed Section
69 of the Public Service Law liberally to close up "the wide gap which
would be left for evasion" 41 if the statute were narrowly interpreted so as
34. See I AN IUAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE CossanssioN 49 (1948). For statis-
tics on refunding by utilities in the United States, see 41 P. U. FORT. 248 (1948).
35. 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SERVIcE Comrznssox 32 (1946). Cf. Re New
York State Electric & Gas Corp., 61 P. U.R. (,.s.) 577 (1945) (abstract) where the Com-
mission denied the company permission to refund 3Y47o bonds with 4% preferred stock
because of the higher fixed charges. But cf. Orange & Rockland Electric Co., I ANNUAL
REPORT OF T=E PUBLIC SERVICE CorMmISSION 883 (1937) where the company was not
allowed to refund securities bearing a higher dividend rate because there were funds
available to redeem the old securities.
36. 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE Com3smssION 38 (1940).
37. 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF TE PUBLIC SERVICE COinaa ssiON 33 (1946).
38. 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COmasSIoN 68 (1939).
39. Re Consolidated Edison Co., 22 P.U.R. (N.s.) 239 (1938).
40. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 263 N. Y. 209, 188 N. E. 713
(1934). CI. Re Central Maine Power Corp., 130 Me. 28, 153 A. 187 (1931) where the
Supreme Court of Maine upheld the Maine Public Utility Commission's denial of a re-
funding petition for short-term notes where proceeds of latter were used to cover the
discount on bonds issued to acquire property.
41. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 263 N. Y. 209, 215, 188 N. E.
713, 714 (1934).
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to allow utility companies to refund short term obligations not requiring
Commission consent without first obtaining authorization for the refunding
securities.
The Commission has also given permission to refund obligations where
the proceeds of the obligations had been used to buy common stock of an-
other electric utility4 2 and where the proceeds had been used to buy the
company's own bonds. 43 The authorization, in the former case, for the
refunding of bonds originally issued to buy common stock of another company
was justified by the Commission on the ground that the refunded bonds
had been authorized in 1925 and at the date of the case (1942) the Commis-
sion was in no position to compel the sellers of the stock to repay the petition-
ing utility. The Commission did, however, require that the new debentures
be subject to annual sinking fund provisions to retire the bonds.
3. Utility Plant Properties Supporting Security Issues
It is the policy and practice of the Commission to require that securities
issued be supported by asset accounts, which, at fully depreciated values,
exceed the amount of the refunding securities and other outstanding obliga-
tions.45 Accordingly, the Commission has denied permission to refund where
the property accounts failed to support the new securities. 40 But where
the properties are inadequate to support the refunding securities, the Com-
mission may yet authorize their issuance on condition that sinking funds
be set up to amortize the securities.47
The Commission's power to deduct accrued depreciation from property
accounts in order to ascertain if refundings are to be allowed seems clear,
although the courts have not yet had occasion to review such action by
the Commission. In rate cases the courts have upheld the Commission's
power to make its own finding as to accrued depreciation to be deducted
from the property accounts in determining the rate base. In Matter of
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Maltbie,48 a temporary rate case, the Court
of Appeals has held that the Commission may ignore the company's retire-
ment reserve account and make its own finding as to accrued depreciation
which is to be deducted from the original cost of properties in computing
the rate base. That case arose under Section 114 of the Public Service Law
which empowers the Commission to deduct accrued depreciation from the
42. Long Island Lighting Co., 1 Aa xuAL REPORT oP n Punurc SEvcz CoinxissioN
410 (1942).
43. Re Consolidated Edison Co., 22 P.U.R. (rzs.) 239 (1938).
44. Long Island Lighting Co., 1 ANxuAL REP RT OF THE PUBI3c SERVICE CoMMSIo:N
410, 419 (1942).
45. 1 AmuAL REoRT or m PUBLIC SERvic Coma.nssixo 70 (1939) and 1 AmnuAs
REPoRT OP T PUBIac SnvrcE Coaussiox.z 48 (1948).
46. Re New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 67 P.U.R. (N.s.) 321 (1946).
47. See Long Island Lighting Co., 1 ANuAL. REPoRT or =an PUrc Su.aca Cor.us-
siox 616 (1941).
48. 300 N. Y. 196, 90 N. E. 2d 35 (1949).
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original cost of properties used and useful in the public service in fixing tem-
porary rates so as to allow a five percent rate of return on the rate base.
In the Matter of the Application of Long Island Lighting Co. v. Maltbie,40
a permanent rate case, the Appellate Division has upheld the Commission's
finding of accrued depreciation based on the straight-line method where
such finding had support in evidence submitted by the Commission.
Such a policy of allowing only capitalization of depreciated plant value
is consistent with the Commission's practice in rate cases of deducting observed
depreciation in computing the rate base, and, it is submitted, is correct.
The refunding of securities based on properties carried at higher valuations
than those in the rate base would mean that rates would not be sufficient
to meet the fixed charges of the securities. If the Commission were to
allow utilities to refund securities without requiring that the stocks or
bonds be backed by sound property values, then a company could issue
securities, refuse to make adequate depreciation provisions on property
backing the securities issued, pay out dividends to the amount of accrued
depreciation and then refund the old securities, forcing the Commission to
resort to sinking fund requirements to protect the investors and consumers.
4. Unamortized Debt Discount and Expense
An-important problem arising in refunding operation is the disposition of
the unamortized portion of discount and expenses of refunded security issues.
The Commission has adopted as its policy the immediate write-off to surplus
of such unamortized amounts.O This rule, applied rigorously, can have a
serious impact on a company whose surplus account cannot absorb the
full amount of the charge. This was the situation in the New York State
Electric and Gas Corporation case in 1941. 1 There, a $3,000,000 charge
to earned surplus of unamortized discount required by the Commission
created a deficit which was made up by a transfer from the common stock
capital account of an amount equal to the deficiency. The utility company
had maintained a policy of paying common stock dividends without taking,
as the Commission thought, adequate charges for depreciation over a period
of years.
In view of the fact that the United States Supreme Court has authorized
amortizing the old discount and expenses of issuance and call premiums
over the life of new bonds for income tax purposesO2 and since there is
authority to amortize those items over the unexpired portion of the refunded
49. 249 App. Div. 918, 292 N. Y. Supp. 807 (3d Dep't 1937). Cf. Federal Power
Commission et al. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944), where the court ac-
cepted the Federal Power Commission's finding as to accrued depreciation in a rate case.
50. 1 AirxuAL REPORT OF T PUBLC SERVICE Comnssiox 44 (1941).
51. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., I ANNuAL REPORT OF Th5 PUBLIC SERVICE
CoindassioN 45 (1941).
52. Great Western Power Co. of California v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 297
U. S. 543 (1936).
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bonds,5 3 the New York Commission's insistence on an immediate write-off
to surplus may work a hardship and defeat one important purpose of a
refunding operation, namely, lower interest charges, through the lowering
of the sales price of the new issue due to impairment of surplus."' However,
in most cases the amount of the unamortized discount and expence will not
be large enough to cause difficulties of the kind mentioned. Since there is
support for the Commission's position in the Federal Power Commission,S
it is difficult to deny the validity of that position in such a matter of account-
ing practice. The New York Commission's attempt to require that the ex-
penses of a new security issue be charged in whole to surplus has been held
to be confiscatory by the New York courtsY0
5. Call Premiums and Selling Prices of Securities
The Commission maintains a close supervision over the call premiums
on refunding securities as on other security issues and in addition requires
that all securities issued be callable or redeemableP 7 In many cases the
Commission has determined that call premiums on preferred stock53 and
redemption premiums on bonds5 9 were too high. In addition the Commission
regulates the interest and dividend rates of security issues and attempts to
insure that the lowest possible rates are obtained by requiring competitive
bidding in most cases.c0  However, the Commission has in a recent case
53. Re Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 33 P.U. R. (.s.) 207 (1940) (New Jersey
Board of Public Utility Commissioners). See 28 P. U. Form. 360 (1941) for the view that
if an original cost rate base is used, then to be consistent the Commission should allow the
write-off of unamortized discount and expense over the life of the refunded bonds or a
later period so that a historical cost of money is obtained.
54. See Dahl, Some Comments on Public Utility Refunding Operations, 12 J. LL"m &
P. U. Eco. 256 (1936) for a discussion of the effect of such a situafion on the marketing
of new bonds where no surplus exists to absorb the unamortized discount and expensa to
be charged off.
55. Re Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 35 P. U. R. (N.s.) 324 (1940) (Federal Power
Commission Opinion no. 53).
56. In the Matter of the Application of the New York Edison Co. et al. v. Maltbie,
244 App. Div. 685, 281 N. Y. Supp. 223 (3d Dep't 1935), a f'd per curiam, 271 N. Y. 103,
2 N. E. 2d 277 (1936).
57. 1 A--NuAL R.POR or Tm Ptmr c SaRvic Co ss.os ON 38 (1940).
58. Re Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., 60 P.U.R. (,.s.) 193 (1945) ($5 premium); Re
Long Island Lighting Co., 73 P.U.R. (xr.s.) 266 (1947) ($5 premium); Re Kings County
Lighting Co., 62 P.U.R. (wrs.) 193 (1946) (10% premium).
59. Re New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 67 P.U.R. (zr.s.) 321 (1946) (3 points
maximum premium); Re New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 74 P.U.R. (.r.s.) 424
(1948) (3 points maximum premium).
60. 1 Ar Ar. REPoRT oF = Pumrae SEnvzcn Co.anxsszor 47 (1949). The Commis-
sion in this report emphasizes the need for exceptions to the policy of required competitive
bidding in cases where market conditions are unstable, where the expenses of sale through
underwriters would be too high, and where the expense of filing fees payable to the SEC
would make public sale unwise.
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not required competitive bidding where the company could sell a security
issue to an insurance company and save the expense of filing fees that would
have to be paid to the Securities and Exchange Commission were the securities
publicly offered. 01
B. Other Purposes for Which Securities May Be Issued
1. Operating Expenses
In two cases decided in 1948, the Commission authorized the issuance
of three-year and five-year obligations to pay operating expenses. 2 But
these authorizations were indicated to be most unusual and were only
made because of the serious credit position of the utilities involved. The
Commission required that the securities issued be amortized by means of
sinking funds to preclude the use for other purposes of funds obtained from
income. In the same year an electric utility was denied permission to issue
securities to pay income taxes of prior years and also the expenses of a
cycle change-over. 3 These cases illustrate the Commission's sound policy
that security issues must be backed by properties capable of earning the
charges on the securities. Only in extraordinary situations has the Commis-
sion abandoned that policy.
2. Refunding Expenses
The Commission has allowed an electric company to issue fifteen-month
notes to pay the call premiums and out-of-pocket expenses of a refunding
operation on condition that the securities be amortized by a sinking fund.
04
Monthly payments were required to retire the notes. The reluctance of the
Commission to allow costs of refunding to be spread over a period extending
beyond the date of refunding is consistent with the policy requiring an im-
mediate charge-off to surplus of unamortized discount and expense in a
refunding operation. But it is arguable that the cost of new securities in-
cludes the cost of calling in the old obligations, and in many cases the refusal
of the Commission to allow refunding costs to be capitalized can work a
severe hardship on a company wanting to take advantage of lower interest
and dividend rates.
3. Security Issues as Collateral for Other Securities
In a recent case a utility company was denied permission to issue first
mortgage bonds as collateral for a promissory note 5 where the note pro-
vided for the sale of the bonds pledged. The Commission said that because
the pledgee could sell the collateral without permission of the Commission
61. Re Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., 78 P. U. R. (N.s.) 585 (1949) (abstract).
62. Re Schenectady Ry. Co., 78 P. U. R. (Ns.) 384 (1948) (abstract); Rochester Tele-
phone Corp., 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COaMMISSION 54 (1948).
63. Re New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 74 P. U. R. (N.s.) 424 (1948).
64. Long Island Lighting Co., 1 ANNrUAL REPORT Or TnE PUBIC SERVICE CoMhIssION
449 (1942).
65. Re Western New York Water Co., 78 P.U.R. (N.s.) 583 (1949) (abstract).
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on default of payment on the note, such a provision would give the pledgee
control over the sale price of the bonds which is a matter for the Commission
to regulate.
4. Capitalization of Earnings
Nor does the Commission allow the capitalization of earnings as a basis
for the issuance of securities.68 Securities must be backed by properties
of sound value, and the properties must earn more than enough to pay
all operating expenses and the cost of the capital hired. Fixed charges must
be earned by a comfortable margin.6 7  But the Commission has allowed
the parent company to guarantee the bonds of a subsidiary although the
subsidiary earned its fixed charges only 1.25 times.P In that case the
parent had earned its fixed charges 2.98 times and for that reason, and also
because the bonds to be issued and guaranteed by the parent were subordinated
to a general mortgage, the Commission allowed the parent to guarantee the
issue.
V. MISCELLANEOUS PIOBLEMS
The Commission attempts as much as possible to keep the proportion
of bonds and fixed interest obligations in the capital structure below 60
per cent.P Accordingly, the Commission has denied approval of the pro-
posed capital structure of a reorganized electric utility where the ratio
of debt to net assets exceeded 60 per cent. ° But the Commission has
authorized the issuance of fixed-interest obligations where, because of its poor
credit position, the company could not sell stock71 and the sale of debentures
instead of stock meant that 67 per cent of the total capital would be in-
debtedness as against a previous 46 per cent. Likewise the Commission has
authorized the issuance of first mortgage bonds prior to an issuance of pre-
ferred stock proposed by the company even though the effect was to make
the debt temporarily in excess of the 60 per cent limit.7 2 The Commission
refused to permit the simultaneous issuance of the securities even though
this would have had the effect of keeping the debt below 60 per cent
of the total capital, and, therefore, might have been a factor in helping the
utility to obtain a better price for its bonds.73 The objection that the
66. Re Kings County Lighting Co., 68 P.U.R. (Ns.) 296 (1947).
67. Re Patchogue Electric Light Co., 73 P.U.R. (2s.) 129 (1948); Re Nerw York
State Electric & Gas Corp., 67 P.U.R. (us.) 321 (1946).
68. Re Westchester Lighting Co., 78 P.U.R. (us.) 583 (1949) (abstract).
69. 1 AuuuAL REPORT OF THE PuBric SERvcE CoilxssIon 46 (1949).
70. Re Long Island Lighting Co. et al., 73 P.U.R. (ns.) 266 (1947).
71. Rochester Telephone Corp. et at., 1 AmUAL RroPrT oF TaE Punrsc Sm mcvc Com-
inssiox 54 (1948).
72. Re New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 74 P. U.R. (z;.s.) 424 (1948).
73. Cf. Re New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 61 P. U. R. (,.s.) 57 (1945) (abstract)
where the Commission denied permission to issue refunding 4% preferred stock in re-
demption of 3Y41% bonds even though such an issue would decrease the proportion of
debt in the capital structure
1953]
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preferred stock investors would not know of securities having prior claims
could not be made where bonds and preferred stock are issued simultaneously.
However, if sufficient publicity had been given to both proposed issues
before the securities were offered, the Commission's action would seem un-
objectionable in requiring the bonds to be issued first, followed by a ten day
interval before the preferred stock could be sold.
VI. THE "ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC" PROBLEm
A. Imposition by the Commission of Conditions on the Authorization of
Securities
One of the most powerful and effective weapons of regulation available
to the Public Service Commission in the past two decades has been its use
of conditions attached to its consents to petitions for security issues.7 4
By exchanging prompt authorizations of security issues for the utilities'
agreements to carry out the Commission's wishes in write-down of plant
accounts,75 and in setting up adequate depreciation reserves,70 the Commission
has succeeded in correcting to a great extent the overcapitalization of the
1920's with the attendant write-ups of plant accounts and payment of large
dividends from funds that should have been set aside out of depreciation
provisions and used for plant replacement. 7
As an illustration of what the Commission has accomplished since 1930
in persuading the utility companies to set up larger depreciation reserves,
in 1930 the electric and gas corporations in New York City showed an
average of 1.54% of book cost of fixed capital carried in depreciation reserves
compared with 14% in 1944, and gas and electric corporations outside
New York City carried on their books an average of 5.5% of fixed capital in
1,930 and 15.5% in 1944 in depreciation reserves. 78
This achievement by the Commission is all the more remarkable because
in 1935 the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the Appellate
Division that the Commission had no statutory power to prescribe a straight-
74. See 2 BENjAmrI, ADinsMTRATIvz ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE or NEW YORK 104
(1942).
75. See e.g., New York Power & Light Corp., 1 ANNUAL REPORT Or THE Punc SER VcE
CoimIssioN 515 (1945); Central N. Y. Power Corp., 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF TnH PuBLIc
SERVIcE CoinassIoN 61 (1944) (write-down of common stock required with credit to
unearned surplus to absorb plant write-down to original cost).
76. Yonkers Electric Light & Power Co., 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF TME PUBLIC SERvicE
CoMiassIoN 40 (1946).
77. See 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF TH PUBLIC SERVICE CoinnssION 36 (1941) and Long
Island Lighting Co., id. at 642, for examples of such practices where dividends of 34% per
year were paid on common stock when almost no provision for depreciation was made. Be-
tween 1924 and 1934 $11,000,000 in dividends was paid on the common stock of the Long
Island Lighting Company when the investment in the common stock amounted to
$3,000,000.
78. 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SERviCE CoamssIoN 102 (1945).
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line method of depreciation or any other method of depreciation. 0 The
Commission had circumvented this judicial prohibition by means of the
conditions imposed on authorizations for security issues mentioned pre-
viously. Because of the nature of the securities market, it is highly im-
portant to companies seeking to issue bonds and stocks on the most favor-
able terms to be able to time their offerings to take advantage of temporary
market conditions.80 This factor has given to the Commission the means
of driving hard bargains in the ways indicated above, and the companies
have been almost helpless, practically speaking, to contest this assertion of
Commission power. Because of the factor of market timing for proposed
financing, it is futile for a utility company to litigate the cases where the
Commission has imposed conditions on plant write-downs and increases
in depreciation charges and reserves.
But in 1949, in Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation v. Maltbicsn the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division which had
held that the Commission had no power to require, as conditions to the
granting of consent for security issues, that the company adopt the straight-
line method of depreciation, write-down plant accounts and apply out of
earnings annually amounts to make up the deficit created by charges to
surplus required by the conditions. The Appellate Division said that it
could not be maintained in the case before it "that a requirement dealing
with future increase of surplus for depreciation will presently add anything
to the marketability or stability of the securities which petitioner seeks to
issue."'8 2 The court went on to say:
"Should adjustments appear to be necessary in connection with surplus for de-
predation after a legal and proper inspection and appraisal as to observed de-
preciation has been made, the Commission has full power to act."8 3
This decision would seem to have struck a serious blow at the Commission's
power. Since it cannot prescribe the method of depreciation to be followed
by a utility company either directly or by means of conditions attached to
security authorizations, the Commission is powerless to prevent a company
79. New York Edison Co. et al. v. Maltbie et a., 244 App. 'Div. 685, 281 N. Y. S. 223
(3d Dep't 1935), aff'd, 271 N. Y. 103, 2 N. E. 2d 277 (1936).
80. See Donnelly, Relation of Security Regulation to Market Timing, 42 P. U. FoRr.
28 (1948) in which the author points out how utility companies have to pay higher
interest and dividend rates in many cases where the regulatory commissions fail to act
speedily on petitions for financing. See also BARRoN'S, Mfar. 14, 1949, p. 40, where the
statement is made that the delays from the litigation in the Rochester Gas & Electric
case cost the company ten to fifteen yield points more after the case was decided than
would have been necessary had the securities been approved for issue promptly.
81. 273 App. Div. 114, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 671 (3d Dep't 1948), a§'d without opiron,
298 N. Y. 867, 84 N. E. 2d 635 (1949).
82. In the Matter of Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Afaltbie et al., 273 App. Div.
114, 120, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 671, 677 (3d Dep't 1948).
83. Id. at 121, 76 N. Y. S. 2d at 677.
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from paying dividends out of funds which are in actuality a return of capital
and which should be set aside for plant replacements. The dilemma con-
fronting the Commission is one that can only be resolved by the New York
Legislature. Tlat body has consistently failed to act on recommendations made
to it by the Commission, year after year, requesting that the Public Service
Law be amended so as to allow the Commission to prescribe a method of
depreciation. 4
The requirement that utility companies annually set aside out of earnings
adequate depreciation reserves so that plants may be replaced is a sound one
and so widely recognized by non-utility industries and the accounting profession
that even in tax cases, depreciation is recognized as a legitimate operating
expense by means of which the full cost of plant properties may be amortized. 85
Even after the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation case, the utility com-
pany involved agreed, in 1949, to set up depreciation reserves and provided
for annual charges for depreciation on the books substantially in accordance
with the Commission's original condition that was struck down in the main
case.88 This almost universal acceptance in principle of the validity of adequate
depreciation charges related to the using up of plant property over its life
remains beyond the Commission's power to apply until statutory authority
is conferred on the Commission.
Theoretically the utilities can continue to rely on the retirement reserve
system and pay dividends out of a surplus that is in fact partly made up
of a depreciation reserve. When the time comes to replace plant properties
which have become useless the Commission, faced with such a situation, must
authorize security issues to pay for new plant. An effective check may remain
available to the Commission in its assertion of power to require sinking funds
to amortize securities issued under such circumstances. 87 Whether the courts
will uphold this assumption of power by the Commission is not clear in view
of the Rochester Gas and Electric case. That the payment of dividends to
equity owners of funds which rightfully should remain untouched as a cushion
for bondholders and other prior security holders who rely on plant and similar
assets for security endangers the securities held by the two latter groups seems
indisputable. The connection between inadequate depreciation charges and
impairment of the assets that provide adequate service to the public is direct
and real. Surely, such a matter comes within the scope of the "public interest"
to be protected by the Commission's regulatory power. But it is not only
84. See 1 AMNUAL REPORT OF T PUBLIC SERVICE COx"-mssioN 74 (1939); 1 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 190 (1941); 1 ANNUAL REPORT or TIlE PUBIuC
SERVICE CoifInSSION 208 (1946).
85. INT. REV. CODE § 23 (1).
86. 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COM-MSSION 172 (1949); see also id.
at 175, describing the adjustments agreed to be made by the Staten Island Edison Cor-
poration in its plant and depreciation reserve accounts preparatory to reorganization.
87. See Re New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 67 P.U.R. (x.s.) 321 (1946). See
also note 47 supra.
[Vol. 22
COMMENT
the consumer and investor who are injured by this lack of authority in the
Commission-the companies themselves will suffer when wholesale replace-
ments are necessary and the funds for them are unavailable except at the
great risk of overcapitalization. Expensive interest and dividend charges will
have to be paid for the speculative securities issued under such circumstances.
It seems anomalous that the Commission in rate cases8 s has power to deduct
its own estimate of accrued depreciation in computing the rate base, and
the utility companies, for income tax purposes, may deduct annual depreciation
charges on the straight-line method, but the Commission has no power to
require the companies to set aside annual amounts in a depreciation reserve
so as to preclude the disbursement of excessive dividendsps Such a situation
can only tempt the Commission to plan new devices and resort to methods
of regulation not within the spirit or the letter of the Public Service Law. In
an era of cheap money rates, coupled with the important tax advantages of
debt securities, the huge pressures for debt financing point up a serious lack
in the Commission's regulatory power over security issues and over the utilities'
activities in general.
VII. SUMMRY AND CONCLUSION
The work of the New York Public Service Commission in regulating security
issues of public utilities in the period from 1929 through 1949 indicates, on
the whole, a fairly effective regulatory agency. The Commission has recognized
during that period the relation between security issues and operating efficiency.
A utility plant that must meet interest and dividend charges beyond the earning
capacity of the property devoted to the public service cannot operate at full
effectiveness under the threat of recapitalization, reorganization, or bankruptcy
at more or less frequent intervals.
By making certain that securities issued are backed by properties of sound
value, successful service to the public and protection to the investor are at
least made possible, provided, of course, management is otherwise efficient and
the consumers buy the services available. In attempting to correct the situations
resulting from past overcapitalization by requiring plant writedowns, adjust-
ments in depreciation reserves, and sinking funds to amortize "watered"
securities, the Commission has pursued what it seems to have regarded as its
primary duty, albeit at the expense of stretching the meaning of the Public
Service Law to its farthest extent.
The Commission, in meeting the many problems arising in the regulation
of security issues, has sought to safeguard the interests of the consumer, the
bond and preferred stock investor, and the utility owner. It has, for example,
88. See notes 48 and 49 supra.
89. See 1 A-NNUAL REPORT or raE PuBric SEavicr Co*massiox 95 (1939) where
the Commission complains that the companies in rate proceedings resist reductions in
annual depreciation allowances but at the same time insist that accrued depreciation esti-
mates deducted from plant accounts in computing the rate base be kept at minimum
amounts.
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perceived the attempted evasion of the statute as to obligations maturing within
one year by holding repeated renewals of such notes to be securities requiring
Commission consent. It also has successfully persuaded the companies to pro-
vide for plant replacements by recouping the funds required for such purposes
out of earnings rather than out of security issues which bear little relation to
the value of plant properties backing such securities, i.e., to the earning power
of properties dedicated to the public service.
Its record during the twenty years following 1928 indicates that the Public
Service Commission will carry out its statutory duties in the regulation of
security issues satisfactorily, provided that statutory amendments are en-
acted to close up the gap in the Commission's authority revealed by the
cases arising since 1928. With the added statutory authority recommended,
the Commission will help the utility companies to achieve sound financial
structures, to the greater benefit of the consuming public, the stockholders and
other investors without whose capital government regulation in our society
would be meaningless.
